Nepal's Faltering Peace Process

International Crisis Group, Asia Report #163, 19-Feb-09

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite successful elections and a lasting military ceasefire, Nepal’s peace process is facing its most severe tests yet. Major issues remain unresolved: there is no agreement on the future of the two armies, very little of the land seized during the conflict has been returned, and little progress has been made writing a new constitution. Challenges to the basic architecture of the 2006 peace deal are growing from all sides. Key political players, particularly the governing Maoists and the opposition Nepali Congress (NC), need to rebuild consensus on the way forward or face a public backlash. International supporters of Nepal must target assistance and political pressure to encourage the parties to face the threats to peace.

The April 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) elections delivered a convincing victory for the Maoists but left them short of an outright majority. The major parties promised to continue working together but the NC, which came second, refused to join the government that was eventually installed in August 2008. For all its weaknesses, this government is Nepal’s best hope but it is not living up to its promise and there are no viable alternatives. There can be no functional government without the Maoists on board, let alone any hope of proceeding with a constitution-writing process in which they can wield a blocking vote.

Yet the Maoists have not fully adjusted to democratic politics, nor has mainstream politics adjusted to their arrival. There is little unity of effort or intent among the governing coalition partners. Opponents of the Maoists talk up the prospects of a government collapse. Conservative wings of both the NC and the moderate Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), the largest coalition partner, have been reinvigorated. In the face of continued instability, armed protest and burgeoning identity-based movements, the immediate threat to Nepal is not Maoist totalitarianism but a dangerous weakening of the state’s authority and capacity to govern.

Maoist commitment to political pluralism is still highly questionable. Debate within the party – renamed the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), UCPN(M), following its merger with a smaller group – shows the goal of a communist “people’s republic” is still in place. Although leading the government, Maoist leaders continue to threaten renewed revolutionary struggle and the “capture of state power”. Such threats have been underlined by cadres’ continued violent behaviour and an apparent drive to consolidate alternative power bases through affiliated organisations like trade unions.

However, the essence of the peace process, from the November 2005 agreement between the CPN(M) and the mainstream seven-party alliance onwards, was a double transformation. The Maoists were to renounce violence and accept multiparty democracy and international human rights norms. The mainstream parties were to develop more inclusive and democratic internal structures and renounce the bad behaviour that had weakened the post-1990 exercise of democracy. The old politics was discredited and still faces the challenge of renewing itself – with the established parties needing to earn legitimacy.

The Maoists have made a greater effort to change than other parties but their democratic transformation is far from complete. They should take the lead to rebuild confidence by unambiguously renouncing violence and reaffirming their commitment to political pluralism. The Nepali Congress is in a state of organisational and political disarray. The Maoists’ coalition partners also face internal power struggles and tough policy decisions. In short, the democratic alternatives to the Maoists are alarmingly weak: the other parties suffer from exclusiveness and weakened support and offer no fresh options to complete the peace process.

The state of public security and law and order is worrying. Although the incidents that draw most attention – killings, explosions and shutdowns – have all decreased since peaks in the first half of 2008, there is little sense of stability. Districts across the Tarai, from the eastern and central heartland of the Madhesi movement to the far west, continue to be plagued by insecurity and, in many areas, a near collapse of governance and policing. While the police are demoralised, the Nepalese Army (NA) remains a law unto itself, resisting both democratic control and investigation of alleged war crimes during the conflict.

International actors, India, the UN and Nepal’s longstanding donors, have played important roles in promoting peace and now need to maintain consistent pressure on all parties to live up to their commitments. Allowing parts of the peace agreements to drift into abeyance will put the entire process at risk. The common struggle against the monarchy was not the sole foundation for the original negotiations, nor were the initial talks based solely on parties’ self-interest. The search for peace was a powerful, and popularly backed, rationale. All sides knew that the deal deferred some important, difficult topics but they were right in opting to tackle them within a peace process, however contentious, rather than allowing the pursuit of a perfect deal to threaten a return to war. Despite significant political differences, this spirit of consensus underpinned a remarkable peaceful transition. Nepal’s political leaders must urgently rebuild this collaborative spirit and recommit themselves to seeing through the process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To All Political Actors Party to the Peace and Constitutional Processes:

1. Reestablish a basic consensus on completing the peace process and set up the necessary mechanisms, for example by:

a) forming an appropriate political coordination mechanism, such as an inter-party committee or high-level commission, to set priorities, resolve disputes and keep the process on track;

b) establishing an independent monitoring body, with nationwide presence, convening capacity and neutral but respected leadership, to observe and report on all parties’ adherence to their peace commitments and provide impartial, factual updates on shortcomings;

c) seriously considering the possible benefits of international technical and/or secretarial support to such a body; and

d) ensuring the newly constituted Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) promptly starts substantive discussions on integration and rehabilitation of Maoist army combatants.

2. Ensure the constitutional process moves forward by:

a) adhering to the promises of consensus and cooperation set out in all agreements from November 2005 until the June 2008 multiparty commitment;

b) recognising the primacy of fulfilling promises made to the Nepali people as a whole by making a fresh public commitment to this effect;

c) promptly activating the CA committees and ensuring they seek public input in their areas of competence and maintain transparency in their discussions; and

d) making every effort to adhere to the foreshortened timetable but avoiding the temptation to meet deadlines by short-circuiting meaningful debate.

To the Government of Nepal:

3. Focus on peace process implementation by:

a) setting up the commissions and committees specified in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with as broad participation as feasible;

b) ensuring decision-making bodies have capable, senior representation and are adequately empowered, and administratively supported, to fulfil their mandates; and

c) even if independent monitoring mechanisms are established, using government systems to report regularly to the cabinet on progress or problems.

4. Set clear peace process and development priorities by:

a) clarifying and restating, with the support of all coalition members, the key goals of the government’s September 2008 statement of policies and programs;

b) shaping the agenda for donor support by developing clear requests for bilateral and multilateral assistance, and making the most of technical assistance; and

c) improving public communications, framing realistic timetables to manage expectations and building public confidence in the peace process by highlighting success stories.

5. Deliver tangible improvements in the weak law and order situation, by:

a) supporting the work of the home ministry’s public security task force and seriously considering its recommendations, if appropriate requesting international support to implement them;

b) cracking down through non-lethal methods on illegal disruptive protests, while guaranteeing the basic right to strike and peaceful protest;

c) keeping major roads and other infrastructure secure and well patrolled, as well as providing more intensive, community-oriented policing in unstable areas; and

d) strictly controlling the illegal activities of party youth wings, in particular their unlawful efforts to fulfil parallel policing functions.

6. Do not use the stability of the peace process as an excuse for ignoring pressing calls for justice, by:

a) ending the culture of impunity by pursuing investigations and prosecutions of all serious alleged crimes;

b) empowering police to resist pressure to refuse to file cases or drop investigations and take action against individuals and institutions seeking to pervert the course of justice;

c) bringing draft bills on disappearances and the truth and reconciliation commission into law only after consulting victims, experts and the general public, meeting international standards and subjecting legislation to parliamentary approval rather than using ordinances to bypass debate;

d) requesting appropriate international technical assistance for investigations; and

e) responding substantively to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reports on serious and systematic human rights abuses during the conflict, by pursuing criminal investigations and prosecutions of those named as allegedly responsible for repeated, grave breaches of international humanitarian law.

7. Improve the management of state security forces, by:

a) bringing the NA under meaningful democratic control, including establishing parliamentary oversight, fully auditing expenditure and developing the constitutionally mandated work plan for democratisation of the army;

b) making the recently constituted National Defence Council functional, providing it with secretariat support and using it as a forum to feed professional expertise into the political decision-making process;

c) building the functions and capacity of the defence ministry and embarking, if appropriate, with international support, on the joint administrative training of military and civilian officers;

d) ending the obstruction by both state and non-state security forces, in particular the NA, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Nepal Police, of investigations into crimes committed during the conflict; and

e) avoiding politicisation of promotions, transfers and operational matters, perhaps by empowering a multi-party body such as the AISC, in the case of the army, to scrutinise important decisions.

To the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist):

8. Start the process of restoring confidence by unequivocally reaffirming the ceasefire and CPA conditions on ceasing all political violence and the commitment to political pluralism, in word and deed.

9. Fulfil the prime minister’s promise to put the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) under the control of the AISC and end the practice of PLA commanders speaking publicly on sensitive political issues.

10. Fulfil outstanding peace process commitments, in particular:

a) demilitarising the Young Communist League (YCL) and vacating seized premises it currently occupies;

b) promptly discharging under-age and otherwise disqualified combatants from the cantonments, cooperating with the government and international agencies on rehabilitation programs;

c) respecting press freedom, human rights and political pluralism;

d) returning property seized during the conflict; and

e) cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of alleged crimes committed during the conflict and ceasefire periods.

To the Major Established Parliamentary Parties:

11. Make efforts to win back popular legitimacy by:

a) reforming party structures with serious steps towards internal democracy and increased responsiveness to popular demands;

b) taking urgent steps to improve the representation of women and marginalised ethnic, caste and regional groups at all levels of party structures; and

c) considering, at the individual party level or collectively, a renewed public commitment to the promises for changed behaviour embodied in the 2005 twelve-point agreement accompanied by a clear program of action.

To the International Community, in particular India, China, the U.S., EU, UN and Donors:

12. Recognise that the peace process is fragile and incomplete and maintain a commitment to high-level political engagement, including:

a) strongly warning the government and political parties that relations will be damaged by any breakdown in the peace process or failure to control political violence and underlining strong international expectations of consensus and cooperation;

b) calling for a public and definitive Maoist renunciation of violence;

c) pressuring all parties to adhere to the CPA and other agreements and to have debates within that framework; and

d) urging investigations into the worst alleged conflict abuses and offering technical support as appropriate.
13. Recognise that completing the peace and constitutional processes is an essential basis for all development programs and target assistance appropriately, by:

a) developing programs to buttress public confidence in the peace process, for example by encouraging the government to focus on creating jobs and opportunities for youth;

b) maintaining a strong emphasis on human rights, political pluralism and conflict resolution at the heart of all policies, including development aid and military cooperation; and

c) supporting the government’s Nepal Peace Trust Fund, with appropriate emphasis on transparent accounting and fiduciary risk but without earmarking, as well as the UN Peace Fund.

14. Recognise that delay in reforming the security sector compromises all development by draining resources and undermining political progress, by:

a) pushing for concrete, step-by-step progress on building democratic control of the security sector;

b) providing technical assistance, as requested, to parliamentary oversight mechanisms as well as the ministry of defence; and

c) pressing the Nepalese Army to accept civilian oversight and assist in training and capacity building of civilian and military officers.